{"id":46200,"date":"2026-03-26T10:59:59","date_gmt":"2026-03-26T09:59:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/badania.uew.pl\/?p=46200"},"modified":"2026-03-26T11:15:23","modified_gmt":"2026-03-26T10:15:23","slug":"rare-earths-and-economic-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/badania.uew.pl\/en\/rare-earths-and-economic-security\/","title":{"rendered":"Rare\u00a0earths\u00a0and\u00a0economic\u00a0security\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Rare earth elements are no longer just a technological issue. They are increasingly shaping economic and political security. In an interview for Polska Zbrojna journal, dr hab. Przemys\u0142aw Skulski<\/a>, Associate Profesor on WUEB explains why access to these resources is now a strategic challenge and why Europe is not fully prepared.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"WUEB<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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\u201cThe\u00a0difficulties\u00a0Western\u00a0countries\u00a0face in\u00a0accessing\u00a0rare\u00a0earths\u00a0did\u00a0not end with the\u00a0pandemic.\u00a0They\u00a0have\u00a0intensified\u00a0and\u00a0are\u00a0largely\u00a0linked\u00a0to the\u00a0fact\u00a0that\u00a0we\u00a0are\u00a0building\u00a0a new\u00a0global\u00a0security\u00a0architecture.\u201d<\/em>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

From\u00a0technology\u00a0to\u00a0strategy<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The expert commentary highlights a structural issue. For years, Western economies built their advantage on access to raw materials sourced outside their own territories.<\/strong> This model was cost-efficient but did not account for geopolitical risk, which is now becoming increasingly visible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Rare earth elements are a group of 17 chemical elements used in modern technologies. Their unique properties, including magnetic and luminescent characteristics, make them essential in electronics, communication systems, energy technologies and defence solutions. Without them, it is difficult to sustain energy transition, digital development or a modern economy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

A\u00a0world\u00a0that\u00a0gave\u00a0too\u00a0much to China<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The COVID-19 pandemic marked a turning point by exposing the scale of dependence on global supply chains. As Przemys\u0142aw Skulski notes, however, the problem had existed long before. <\/strong>Limited deposits, their uneven geographical distribution and high extraction costs led many Western countries to abandon the development of domestic capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, China consistently strengthened its position by expanding both extraction and processing technologies.<\/strong> As a result, it now controls the vast majority of global rare earth production, despite not holding proportionally the largest reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201eChina has not only built a kind of web limiting access to rare earths from its own deposits, but has also sought to take over those located in other countries<\/em>\u201d.<\/em>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This dominance has both economic and political dimensions. Export restrictions and trade tensions show that access to raw materials can be used as a tool of influence. In practice, this means that European countries and companies must take into account the risk of supply disruptions or rising production costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe is responding, but time cannot be recovered quickly<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Efforts to reduce dependency are underway in both the United States and the European Union. They focus on three main directions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n